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It has been alleged that deconstruction, especially 
the kind associated with Nietzsche and Derrida, threat-
ens the very fabric of Western civilization by under-
mining the very values that made the monuments and 
edifices of this civilization possible and that the 
provenance of this menace is, seemingly, the "elimina-
tion" of the subject. Admittedly, Nietzsche's almost 
monomaniacal onslaught on the widely respected ascetic 
ideal as a nihilistic ideal and Derrida's equivalent 
sole emphasis on the signifier (rather than the much 
revered signified which, for him, is always a transcen-
dental signified) make it less difficult and more 
tempting to charge the two thinkers with all forms of 
nihilism. But such charges, though understandable, 
are, so far, egregiously unjustified. To attack all 
kinds of "humanism" because they are seen as irredeema-
bly tied to phallogocentrism and ethnocentrism is not 
synonymous with attacking humanity, as many critics 
have claimed. "Humanism" cannot and should not stand 
for humanity; in other words, anti-humanism is not nec-
essarily anti-humanity. Anti-"humanists" do not deny 
history nor do they destroy meaning. What they attempt 
to dispense with are those presumptuous authorities who 
immunize history and meaning. The present essay tries 
to delineate the ascetic ideal as Nietzsche's basic 
problem with Western culture. A second essay will 
develop ways (through some Nietzschean and Derridean 
insights) of facing the ascetic ideal's modern mask of 
"humanism" in every sense of the term (secular or non-
secular). How should humanism be faced in the wake of 
the critiques of Nietzsche and Derrida, and are Nietz-
sche and Derrida themselves not a part of the problema-
tic? A future Part 11 of "Deconstruction and Humanism" 
will face this double question. 
I. Breaking The Ground of Heidegger's Nietzsche 
The question of the dreadful discordance between 
art and truth or art and science in Nietzsche is, per-
haps, a question of the relation of gaiety and gravity. 
But Heidegger's Nietzsche ignores gaiety--an avoidance 
which enables Heidegger to avoid the complex and multi-
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plex questions of woman and Christianity or what I call 
the problem of the "Christian woman" in Nietzsche. 
This omission facilitates Heidegger's arduous reduction 
of Nietzsche to positivism. In Chapter 20 of Nietzsche 
1, where Heidegger deals with truth in 'Platonism and 
positivism in relation to "Nietzsche's Attempt to 
Overturn Platonism on the Basis of Fundamental Experi-
ence of Nihilism," he says, 
"It is indisputable that prior to the time of his 
work on the planned magnus opus, The Will to 
Power, Nietzsche went through a period of extreme 
positivism; these were the years 1879-81, the 
years of his decisive development toward 
maturity. Such positivism, though of course 
transformed, became a part of his later fundamen-
tal position also." 1 
It is on this restrictive or metaphysical basis that 
Heidegger delineates Nietzsche's much quoted 1888 
statement: "Very early in my life I took the question 
of the relation of art to truth seriously: and even 
now I stand in-holy dread in the face of this discord-
ance" (Nietzsche 1, 142). 
Nietzsche took the art-truth relation seriously by 
approaching it playfully, and it is this playful dimen-
sion (which encompasses woman and Christianity), miss-
ing in Heidegger's exegesis, that intrigues me. My 
discussion operates within and without the economy of 
gaiety and gravity. Economy here denotes an ever-open 
"dialectic" with no tertiary closure; this economy ena-
bles Nietzsche and enables me to consider the truth/art 
or science/art relation both seriously and playfully. 
Put differently, this economy of gaiety and gravity in-
volves a stylistic plurality which cannot be exclu-
sively identified with either art or science but both; 
therefore, gravity and gaiety are not synonyms for 
truth and art or science and art. 
In his Preface to the 1886 edition of The Birth, 
Nietzsche formally identifies his lifelong concern with 
the relationship between art and science, a relation-
ship he examines by seeing science through the eyes of 
the artist and seeing art through the eyes of life. 
Here there is already the suggestion that art and 
science are "rooted" in life, that they both belong 
together, and that either can assume the other's being. 
Art and science emerge as serious modes of life which 
can play with each other. Therefore, the general 
economy of gaiety and gravity can be characterized as 
play. With such play, the traditional notions of truth 
and art and science as such are seriously and playfully 
put into question, and all we seem to observe thereaf-
ter is chaos or anarchy. 
Dread comes when we seriously play with-and-on our 
grounds of being. Nietzsche's artistic look at science 
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and vitalistic look at art are attempts to resituate 
this twofold mode of being in this world by stripping 
it of transcendent presuppositions which govern the 
dominant traditional perspectives of it. Science and 
art owe their allegiance and being to our world, this 
world, this life. In Sections 5 and 24 of The Birth, 
Nietzsche distinguishes between "existence" and "the 
world": "it is only as an aesthetic phenomenon that 
existence and the world are eternally justified"; 
"existence and the world seem justified only as an aes-
thetic phenomenon." But Nietzsche later obliterates 
this world/existence distinction. In The Gay Science, 
he expatiates upon this collapsed dichotomy. "The 
whole pose," he says, "of 'man against the world', of a 
man as a 'world-negating' principle, of man as the 
measure of the value of things, as judge of the world 
who in the end places existence itself upon his scales 
and finds it wanting--the monstrous insipidity of this 
pose has finally come home to us and we are sick of 
it." He adds that "we laugh as soon as we encounter 
the juxtaposition of 'man and world 1 separated by the 
sublime presumption of the little word 'and'." 
In light of this "world/existence identity," Paul 
de Man is somewhat off base in his warning concerning 
Nietzsche's statement that "Only as an aesthetic pheno-
menon is existence and the world forever justified.1' 
De Man warns, "|the statement) should not be taken too 
serenely, for it is an indictment of existence rather 
than a panegyric of art." I wonder why de Man limits 
his interpretation of this statement to just the 1872 
context, which alone recognizes this separation. 
Nietzsche follows the man-world statement in The 
Gay Science with the following: 
But look, when we laugh like that, have we not 
simply carried the contempt for man one step 
further? And thus also pessimism, the contempt 
for that existence which is knowable by us? Have 
we not exposed ourselves to the suspicion of an 
opposition--an opposition between the world in 
which we were at home up to now with our rev-
erences that perhaps made it possible for us to 
endure life, and another world that consists of 
us--an inexorable, fundamental, and deepest sus-
picion about ourselves that is more and more 
gaining worse and worse control of us Europeans 
and that could easily confront coming generations 
with the terrifying Either/Or: 'Either abolish 
your reverences* or--yourselves'. The latter 
would be nihilism: but would not the former 
also be—nihilism?—This is our question mark. 1 
The above insight (which, like many of Nietzsche's 
other insights, is stated interrogatively) suggests 
that the man-world opposition smacks of nihilism, and 
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he wastes no time in rejecting the two senses of nihil-
ism he evokes here. Nietzsche's reflections on art and 
science seem to be a de-deification of this world, and 
Heidegger's endeavor to cast Nietzsche otherwise be-
comes highly problematic. The seeming chaos or anarchy 
that results from Nietzsche's imprecise or centrifugal 
resituation of the subject of humanism appears to be 
productive. 
According to Heidegger, Nietzsche's main lifelong 
objective is to overturn Platonism by means of inver-
sion. He quotes Nietzsche's 1870-71 statement: "My 
philosophy an inverted Platonism: the farther removed 
from true being, the power, the finer, the better it 
is. Living in semblance as goal*." Heidegger regards 
this statement as "an astonishing preview in the 
thinker of his entire later philosophical position," 
which he labeled earlier as positivism. Although Hei-
degger says that this strategic inversion or "'inverted 
Platonism' of his early period is enormously different 
from the position finally attained in Twilight of the 
Idols," Heidegger's later characterization of the 
method shows that he never saw the method as enormously 
different. Consequently, Heidegger is able to give an 
apparently homogeneous reading of Nietzsche. He de-
fines Nietzsche's positivistic style:-
To overturn Platonism thus means to reverse the 
standard relation: what languishes below in 
Platonism, as it were, and would be measured 
against the supersensuous, must now be put on 
top; by way of reversal, the supersensuous must 
now be placed in its service. When the inversion 
is fully executed, the sensuous becomes being 
proper, i.e., the true, i.e., truth. The true is 
the sensuous. That is what 'positivism' teaches. 
Although he admits that "it would be premature to in-
terpret Nietzsche's conception of knowledge and of the 
kind of truth pertaining to it as 'positivistic'," he 
goes on to do so anyway, insisting that "that is what 
happens" (Nietzsche 1, 154). 
So, for Heidegger, the art/truth or art/science 
discordance in Nietzsche can be settled by scrutinizing 
"Nietzsche's conception of knowledge in relation to the 
two basic tendencies of epistemological interpreta-
tion"—namely, Platonism and positivism (Nietzsche 1, 
153). Since Nietzsche has already identified his 
philosophy as an inverted Platonism, it is only logical 
to align Nietzsche with positivism. Heidegger makes 
this move; he investigates truth in Platonism and posi-
tivism, art (mimesis) and truth (Idea) in Plato's 
Republic. Plato's Phaedrus shows him that "beauty and 
truth" are in "felicitous discordance." He is then 
able to maintain that the art-truth dreadful discord-
ance question in Nietzsche 
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can easily be answered by a simple recalculation, 
if 'overcoming' Platonism may be equated with the 
procedure of standing all of Plato's statements 
on their heads, as it were. To be sure, 
Nietzsche himself often expresses the state of 
affairs in that way, not only in order to make 
clear what lie means in a rough and ready fashion, 
but also because he himself often thinks that 
way, although he is aiming at something else 
(Nietzsche 1, 200-1). 
Therefore, where Plato says truth is worth more than 
art, Nietzsche says art is wortli more than truth; and 
where Plato sees a happy discordance between beauty and 
truth, Nietzsche sees only dread. The "something else" 
Heidegger mentions above is his claim that Nietzsche 
wants to dispense with Platonism by dispensing with its 
history. He bases his claim on Nietzsche's "History of 
an Error." He says of this "History": 
The more clearly and simply a decisive inquiry 
traces the history of Western thought back to its 
few essential stages, the more that history's 
power to reach forward, seize, and commit grows. 
This is especially the case where it is a matter 
of overcoming such history. Whoever believes 
that philosophical thought can dispense with its 
history by means of a simple proclamation will, 
without his knowing it, be dispensed with by 
history; he will be struck a blow from which he 
can never recover, one that will blind him 
utterly. He will think he is being original when 
he is merely rehashing what has been transmitted 
and mixing together traditional interpretations 
into something ostensibly new. The greater a 
revolution is to be, the more profoundly must it 
plunge into its history (Nietzsche 1, 203). 
But does Nietzsche dispense with what he calls the 
two major forms of nihilism—Platonism and Christian-
ity? Does to overcome necessarily mean to destroy? 
Nietzsche seems to have a much humbler sense of his 
task: he is merely trying to resituate Platonism and 
Christianity, not uproot them as Heidegger indicates. 
Nietzsche is not so naive as to believe that such a 
history could be dispensed with even if it were desira-
ble to do so. Nietzsche first realized, and Heidegger 
later (in Identity and Difference) reluctantly ac-
cepted, that language makes impossible the desired 
"step back out of metaphysics." Heidegger, however, 
tries to back out of metaphysics in order to get "into 
the active essence of metaphysics,'" something he 
single-mindedly pursues in "The Anaximander Fragment," 
where he declares that language speaks Being, and con-
sequently, "in order to name the essential nature of 
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Being, language would have to find a single word, the 
unique word."* Nietzsche found this metaphysical 
desire or hope untenable and discarded it. Since 
"Being" is always in question or under erasure, we can-
not find and freeze a master word to speak or indicate 
"Being." Therefore, Nietzsche resorts to the strategic 
economy of gaiety and gravity which involves a plural-
ity of styles which cannot be demarcated or frozen. To 
ignore gaiety and its precarious relation to gravity in 
Nietzsche's operations, as Heidegger does, produces a 
homogeneous reading (although only seemingly), and 
thus, creates a nihilistic Nietzsche. 
But how can Nietzsche be nihilistic when nihilism 
(the negation of this world), is what he wants to over-
come? Of course, one can be nihilistic without his 
knowing it, as Heidegger maintains. However, this 
point is inapplicable here since Heidegger's analysis 
of Nietzsche's attempt at overcoming nihilism shows 
that either Nietzsche is too stupid to know that his 
enterprise is nihilistic or he knows but doesn't care, 
and consequently a somewhat "divine" punishment befalls 
him. For example, he tells us that Nietzsche's 
inversion does not achieve what it must, as an 
overpowering of nihilism, namely, an overcoming 
of Platonism in its very foundations'. Such over-
coming succeeds only when 'above' in general is 
set aside as such, when the former positing of 
something true and desirable no longer arises, 
when the true world—in the sense of the ideal-
is expunged. What happens, when the true world is 
expunged? Does the apparent world still remain? 
No. For the apparent world can be what it is 
only as a counterpart of the true. If the true 
world collapses, so must the world of appear-
ances. Only then is Platonism overcome, which is 
to say, inverted in such a way that philosophical 
thinking twists free of it. But then where does 
such thinking wind up? 
Of course, such thinking winds up in nihilism, and it 
does not seem coincidental that Heidegger follows his 
rhetorical question with the fact of Nietzsche's mad-
ness. What purpose does this allusion serve? Is it 
mere historical information or is Heidegger demonstrat-
ing what happens or can happen to anyone who dares 
"overturn" tradition? He declares, "During the time 
the overturning of Platonism became for Nietzsche a 
twisting free of it, madness befell him" (Nietzsche 1, 
201-3). This statement becomes immediately suspect in 
light of his earlier statement that "Whoever believes 
that philosophical thought can dispense with its his-
tory by means of a simple proclamation will, without 
knowing it, be dispensed with by history; he will be 
struck a blow from which he can never recover, one that 
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will blind him utterly." In other words, Nietzsche's 
madness is a punishment for his serious attempt to dis-
pense with history, for during his final creative year 
(1888), which was, according to Heidegger, the apex of 
his "overturning" of Platonism, Nietzsche became mad—a 
blow from which' he never recovered. Heidegger contends 
that "The History of an Error," which Nietzsche 
"composed a few days during that final year of creative 
work," exemplifies Nietzsche's method of reversal. 
Nietzsche's "History of an Error" (a section of 
Twilight of the Idols), is a dense critique of his 
lifelong "enemies": Platonism and Christianity as 
basic forms of nihilism. In this "History" he identi-
fies "woman" as a function of Christian nihilism--a 
theme which he develops in The A n t i c h r i s t . 
One can call "The History of an Error" the problem 
of the "Christian woman" in Nietzsche. This twofold 
problematic is in the second sequence of this six-part 
history of Western history. Here he says: Platonism, 
or "the Idea," "becomes a woman, it becomes Christian." 
Derrida (in Spurs) has already critiqued Heidegger's 
omission of woman in his exegesis of this crucial sec-
tion of "The History of an Error." Derrida also dis-
cusses the "places" of woman in Nietzsche, but the 
Platonism-woman-Christianity "metamorphosis" still hun-
gers for some further elaboration. Heidegger rarely 
expounds on Nietzsche's relation to Christianity. The 
little he says in Nietzsche 1 about this issue is illu-
minating but somewhat misleading. He attributes Nietz-
sche's "new interpretation of Platonism" to his "funda-
mental experience of the development of nihilism." He 
adds that Nietzsche "sees in Platonism the primordial 
and determining grounds of the possibility of nihil-
ism's upsurgence and of the rise of life-negation. 
Christianity is in Nietzsche's eyes nothing other than 
'Platonism for the people'." As Platonism, therefore, 
Christianity is nihilism. 
Instead of delineating Nietzsche's conception of 
Christianity as nihilism or showing in what sense 
Christianity is nihilism, Heidegger appears to avoid 
this strategically by claiming, "Nietzsche's opposition 
to the nihilistic tendency of Christianity, his posi-
tion as a whole with respect to the historical phenome-
non of Christianity, is not delineated exhaustively" 
(Nietzsche 1, 159). Yet, in spite of this alleged 
inexhaustive delineation, Heidegger does not hesitate 
to draw far-reaching unequivocal conclusions about 
Nietzsche. The Will to Power, which is the foundation 
of Heidegger 1^ metaphysical interpretation of 
Nietzsche, is a fragment. As he himself admits: 
"Insight into these important connections is quite dif-
ficult on the basis of the book The Will to Power as it 
lies before us in its present form, since the textual 
fragments assembled here have been removed from a great 
number of manuscripts" (Nietzsche 1, 202). Yet, the 
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book's fragmentary treatment of the will to power does 
not prevent Heidegger from writing voluminously, didac-
tically, and definitively about Nietzsche as "the last 
Western metaphysician." 
Furthermore, Heidegger's admission that Nietzsche's 
attack on Christianity as nihilism is not a blanket 
condemnation of Christianity is curious. He says, 
"Nietzsche is far too perspicacious and too sovereignly 
intelligent not to know and acknowledge that an essen-
tial presupposition for his own behavior, the probity 
and discipline of his inquiry, is a consequence of the 
Christian education that has prevailed for centuries." 
He even cites "two pieces of evidence from among the 
many available" to attest to Nietzsche's acknowledge-
ment of his indebtedness to the Christian tradition 
(Nietzsche 1, 159-60). Heidegger also prefaces his 
Nietzsche 1 with a quote from The Anti-Christ: "Well-
nigh two thousand years and not a single new god." If 
Nietzsche unqualifiedly equates Christianity with a 
form of Platonism and Platonism with a form of nihil-
ism, and if his enterprise is a countermovement to 
nihilism, and if this countermovement is nothing but an 
attempt to dispense with Platonism, it then follows, 
under Heidegger's scheme, that Nietzsche is not only 
digging the grave of one kind of nihilism but also cul-
tivating the ground for another kind of nihilism--an 
exercise which will make him an ally of the very nihil-
ism he is supposedly out to eliminate. Yet Heidegger 
has told us that "Nietzsche is far too perspicacious 
and too sovereignly intelligent" to behave in such a 
nihilistic way. The inherent ambiguity here fails to 
compel Heidegger to seek a non-homogeneous reading of 
Nietzsche. An exploration of Nietzsche's relation to 
Christianity and the "places" of woman in this rela-
tion, which Heidegger never scrutinizes, will burst 
open Heidegger's metaphysical reading. His avoidance 
of such questions becomes a convenient strategy that 
enables him from inside to maintain his restrictive 
interpretation. Heidegger, it appears, reads Nietzsche 
metaphorically when it is convenient for him to do so 
and castigates any metaphorical reading when it is not 
in his analytical interest to do so. 
Heidegger's strategy of protecting his metaphysical 
reading of Nietzsche is particularly noticeable in his 
critique of the question of biologistic aesthetics. He 
says: 
However often and however fatally Nietzsche both 
in language and in thought was diverted into 
purely physiological naturalistic assertions 
about art, it is an equally fatal misunderstand-
ing on our part when we isolate such physiologi-
cal thoughts and bandy them about as 'biologis-
tic' aesthetics. It is even worse to confuse 
them with Wagner. We turn everything inside out 
159 
when we make a philosophy of orgiastics out of it 
(Nietzsche 1, 159-60). 
Earlier he says, 
We cannot deny that the things physiology grap-
ples with—particular states of the body, changes 
in internal secretions, muscle flexions, occur-
rences in the nervous system—are also proper to 
affects, passions, and feelings. But we have to 
ask whether all these bodily states and the body 
itself are grasped in a metaphysically adequate 
way, so that one may without further ado borrow 
material from physiology and biology, as Nietz-
sche, to his own detriment, so often did. 
And he concludes: " the One fundamental point to real-
ize here is that no result of any science can ever be 
applied immediately to philosophy" (Nietzsche 1, 45). 
Even though Heidegger acknowledges above that Nietz-
sche's aesthetics often relies heavily on both physi-
ology and biology, he later dispenses with the biologi-
cal, dismissing it as biologism. Is all that is bi-
ological in Nietzsche also biologistic? How can one 
explain away the many biological references to the 
human body in Nietzsche simply as metaphorical 
references? What makes some metaphorical and others 
non-metaphorical? Heidegger, apparently bent on prov-
ing that Nietzsche is a metaphysician, ignores the 
physiology/biology problematic. He insists that "Where 
art is to be grasped in its supreme form, in terms of 
the grand style, we must reach back into the most orig-
inal states of embodying life, into physiology." 
Nietzsche's art, reduced to physiological aesthetics, 
brings Nietzsche within the realm of metaphysics since 
the concepts of "Art as countermovement to nihilism and 
art as state of rapture, as object of physiology 
('physics' in the broadest sense) and as object of 
metaphysics" are not mutually exclusive (Nietzsche 1, 
126). In other words, Nietzsche's reflections on art 
constitute a physiological aesthetics because such aes-
thetics "examines the state of creation and enjoyment" 
and never the work itself and it is "the 'extreme' aes-
thetics inasmuch as that state is pursued to the far-
thest perimeter of the bodily state as such, to what is 
farthest removed from the spirit, from spirituality of 
what is created, and from its formalistic lawfulness" 
although it must be noted that "While the body state as 
such continues to participate as a condition of the 
creative process, it is at the same time what in the 
created thing is to be restrained, overcome, and sur-
passed" (Nietzsche 1, 129). So, Heidegger thinks that 
he has been able to show that Nietzsche makes the 
mistake of trying to apply immediately the result of a 
science to philosophy. Again, his seemingly homo-
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geneous reading ironically demonstrates the impossibil-
ity or futility of such a task, for always implicit in 
such reading is a heterogeneity which resists any such 
totalization. 
II. Science and the Ascetic Ideal 
Art and truth in Nietzsche cannot simply be con-
flated into a positivistic will to power as Heidegger 
does. If Nietzsche can be labeled at all, the label 
would be "the will to life" or "the will to live" or 
"the eternal affirmation of life," not "nihilism." 
Nietzsche is a serious gay scientist, and note that the 
term "gay" or "gaiety" denotes joyful play. Nietzsche 
measures life according to the will to live it here in 
this world; therefore, he cherishes whatever affirms 
such a life and denigrates whatever negates such a 
life. He tells us that gay scientists are "those who 
not only see the terrifying and questionable character 
of existence but live it, want to live it."* Art 
should look at science as the artist would look at it--
as a "lie," a life-affirming lie; similarly, we should 
look at art as life would look at it--as a simulacrum--
because, as he puts it, "all of life is based on sem-
blance, art, deception, points of view, and the neces-
sity of perspectives." Art, in a paradoxical sense, 
becomes a lie that tells truths while "science" becomes 
a truth that tells lies. But such art and such science 
have to penetrate each other perpetually in such a way 
that they cannot afford to be friends or enemies. 
There are many ambiguous and recurring basic func-
tional terms in Nietzsche, and they usually come in 
twos or have two forms: art and truth (or art and sci-
ence), good and bad, slave morality and noble morality, 
man and woman, the overman and the last man, 
Christianity, nihilism, decadence, life, world, ex-
istence, tragedy, beauty, evil, history, philosopher, 
Dionysian and Apollinian, the will to power, lie, etc. 
Emerson recalls in "The American Scholar": "All things 
have two handles" and warns us to "beware of the wrong 
one."' But in Nietzsche we hardly if ever know which 
handle is which. Hence interpreting Nietzsche's 
various ideas centripetally as expressions of any one 
frozen master term is fraught with danger; in Nietzsche 
we are almost always standing on precarious grounds. 
In order to discuss fruitfully the dreadful art-
truth or art-science relation, we may have to reflect 
on Nietzsche's relation to the ascetic ideal, which, in 
one sense, ties art, truth, science, woman, and Chris-
tianity together. Art, truth, science, and Christian-
ity have forms based on the ascetic ideal, and woman 
has traditionally been their most effective means of 
consolidating this ascetic ideal. In their nihilistic 
forms, art, truth, science, and Christianity become 
earth-negating conspirators with woman as their major 
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occasional acjent. He sharply objects to the ascetic 
ideal because he accuses it of negating life since its 
ultimate allegiance is to a world beyond this world. 
Nietzsche recognizes only one world, this world, this 
earth. In Zarathustra he contends that, "It was the 
sick and decaying who invented the heavenly realm and 
the redemptive drops of blood." 7 In On the Genealogy 
of Morals (where he textualizes morality), Nietzsche 
alleges that this ascetic ideal's presupposition of 
another realm is a lie, and urges a vigorous assault on 
it. He sees the priest as the ascetic ideal par-
excellence, and argues that science or philosophy as 
presently constituted or practiced has been not only 
inadequate for the encounter with the ascetic ideal but 
also, historically, an ally of its supposed enemy, this 
ascetic ideal. Therefore, Christianity and science 
must be basically distrusted as conveyors of truth as 
such. He emphasizes that science is not the natural 
antagonist of the ascetic ideal since somewhere the 
scientific ideal and the ascetic ideal meet. Science 
usually appears at first as an enemy fighting the 
ascetic ideal, but closer inspection often shows that 
it is not dealing with "the ideal itself but only its 
exteriors, its guise and masquerade, its temporary dog-
matic hardening and stiffening, and by denying what is 
exoteric in this ideal, it liberates what life is in 
it." Therefore, "a depreciation of the ascetic ideal 
unavoidably involves a depreciation of science." In 
other words, Nietzsche attacks a certain conception of 
science or philosophy or knowledge since it creates 
truth as such and protects it. 
After rejecting scientism and religious dogma, 
Nietzsche seeks alliance with life-affirming art, con-
tending, "art . . . in which precisely the lie is sanc-
tified and the will to deception has a good conscience, 
is much more fundamentally opposed to the ascetic ideal 
than is science."* Hence in The Will to Power he 
describes art as the countermovement to nihilism. He 
calls Plato "the greatest enemy of art Europe has yet 
produced" because he instinctively understands the 
formidableness of art as an opponent of the ascetic 
ideal. He adds, "Plato versus Homer: that is the com-
plete, the genuine antagonism—there the sincerest ad-
vocate of the 'beyond', the great slanderer of life; 
here the instinctive deifier, the golden nature" 
(Genealogy, Third Essay, Section 25). This Plato/Homer 
tension here parallels the Socratism/tragedy tension in 
The Birth. 
In Section 24 of The Third Essay of the Genealogy, 
Nietzsche states parenthetically, "Whoever has the op-
posite notion, whoever tries, for example, to place 
philosophy 'on a strictly scientific basis' first needs 
to stand not only philosophy but truth on its head . . 
. ." Heidegger exploits this statement metaphysically. 
Nietzsche does not want to put science on a strictly 
162 
scientific basis. Hence he charges science and the 
ascetic ideal of sharing metaphysical and physiological 
foundations. He continues his onslaught: "a certain 
impoverishment of life is a presupposition of both of 
them--these affects grown cool, the tempo of life 
slowed down, dialectics in place of instinct, serious-
ness imprinted on faces and gestures." He then calls 
gravity or seriousness "the most unmistakable sign of a 
labored metabolism, of struggling, laborious life." He 
points out, in his Preface to the 1886 edition of The 
Birth, that his dissatisfaction with science made him 
pose science as a problem and science framed as a pro-
blem simply asks for "the meaning of science." 
Nietzsche is particularly angry with science be-
cause he himself is in the business of inquiry, and if 
science, which he had hitherto regarded as the strong 
adversary of the ascetic ideal, is beginning to prove 
otherwise, then it is time he changed strategy. Gaiety 
and gravity have to play as irreconcilable functions of 
life. 
Science, under the guise of anti-ascetic ideal, is 
deadly because "it is the most unconscious, involun-
tary, hidden and subterranean ally." Consequently, 
"the ascetic has decidedly not been conquered: if any-
thing, it becomes stronger," "more elusive, more 
spiritual, [and) more captious." What Nietzsche main-
tains throughout Section 25 of the Genealogy (Third 
Essay) is that "a transcendent solution to the riddle 
of existence" devalues or negates or impoverishes' life 
here on earth and makes existence a beggarly affair. 
However, he concedes that 
It is still a metaphysical faith that underlies 
our faith in science--and we godless men and 
anti-metaphysicians, I for] we, too, still derive 
our flame from the fire ignited by a faith mille-
nia old, the Christian faith, which was also 
Plato's, that God is truth, that truth is divine 
(Genealogy, Third Essay, Section 24). 
Nietzsche knows that Christianity has helped funda-
mentally to produce Nietzsche. He also recognizes 
Christian marks on the world text, and his struggle to 
rid Christianity of the ascetic ideal is not an under-
mining of this indebtedness. What seems to be an issue 
for Nietzsche is not the destruction of Christianity or 
Platonism but the development and maintenance of an on-
going strenuous critical attitude toward these 
priveleged or unduly protected phenomena. Therefore, 
when he proclaims, "well-nigh two thousand years and 
not a single new god," he is not seeking to replace 
Christianity or Platonism with another foundational 
system with a transcendent presupposition that devalues 
this world, this life. As Derrida notes, "the politi-
cal maneuver of cryptography does not consist in in-
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venting new religions but in making use of the rema-
nence, in 'taking advantage of those . . . already es-
tablished . . .'"» Nietzsche only wants to transvalue 
truth in relation to Platonism, Christianity, art, and 
science in order to prune them of their life-negating 
or earth-impoverishing transcendent presuppositions. 
He knows that such a deconstructive task is awesome. 
"From the moment faith in the God of the ascetic ideal 
is denied, a new problem ajri_ses: that of the value of 
truth," he points out. ~He then concludes, "the will to 
truth requires a critique," that is, "the value of 
truth must for once be experimentally called into 
question" (Genealogy, Third Essay, Section 24). A sem-
inal critique is essentially a radical resituation of 
one's relations to tradition, not the destruction of 
tradition. We are always somehow giving in to tradi-
tion, but as Derrida notes, that "does not mean that 
all the ways of giving in to it are of equal per-
tinence," and he adds, "The quality and fecundity of a 
discourse are perhaps measured by the critical rigor 
with which this relation to the history of metaphysics 
and to inherited concepts is thought." 1 0 Nietzsche is 
often aware of this inescapability of logocentrism, but 
his stylistic hyperbolism and exuberance usually make 
us lose sight of this awareness. The fact that we can-
not totally and permanently escape from tradition does 
not mean that we should live within it; Nietzsche's 
styles of gaiety and gravity enable him to live within 
and without metaphysics, or to live on borderlines, as 
Derrida would say. 
III. Women as Medicine and Poison 
Gaiety and gravity involve joyful plays (if by joy-
ful plays we also mean danger and suffering). Nietz-
sche tells us in Zarathustra that he "would believe 
only in a god who could dance |play|," and warns, "not 
by wrath does one kill but by laughter." He, there-
fore, invites us to join him in the killing of "the 
spirit of gravity" (p. 153). Note that he is not 
against gravity per se but against the spirit, the 
style, of gravity. In Section 327 of The Gay Science, 
under the title of "Taking Seriously," he mocks gravity 
or any kind of thinking that takes itself too seriously 
or that promotes or pursues the ascetic ideal. 
In Section 817 of The Will to Power, Nietzsche asks 
the rhetorical question: "Would any link at all be 
missing in the chain of art and science if woman, if 
the works of women were missing?" In Section 511 of * 
Daybreak titled "The Temptress," Nietzsche says: 
"Honesty is the great temptress of all fanatics. That 
which seemed to approach Luther in the shape of the 
Devil or a beautiful woman, and which warded off in so • 
uncouth a manner, was no doubt honesty, and perhaps, in 
rarer cases, even truth. " , l In The Will to Power 
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(Section 465), he continues: "I treat previous philo-
sophers as contemptible libertines hiding in the cloak 
of the 'truth'. And in the second stage of his six-
stage "history of an error"in Twilight of the Idols, he 
identifies woman with Christianity: 
The real world, unattainable for the moment, but 
promised to the wise, the pious, the virtuous man 
("to the sinner who repents") (Progress of the 
idea: it grows more refined, more enticing, more 
incomprehensible--it becomes a woman, it becomes 
Christian . . .) (Note that only the statement on 
woman is stressed.) 1 2 
In his Preface to Beyond Good and Evil, he rhetorically 
equates truth with women and charges previous dogmatic 
philosophers with approaching woman inadequately. He 
insists that speaking of spirit and the good in ab-
solutist terms as Plato does means "standing truth on 
her head and denying perspective itself," which, for 
Nietzsche, is "the basic condition of all life." 1' In 
The Gay Science (Section 339--"Vita Femina"), he de-
clares that "''life is a woman" and describes life as 
"covered by a veil interwoven with gold, a veil of 
beautiful possibilities, sparkling with promise, res-
istance, bashfulness, mockery, pity, and seduction." 
In Section 232 of Beyond Good and Evi1, he says, after 
indicting reactive feminism, that what woman wants is 
not truth as such but truth or art as lie. Hence woman 
is preoccupied with appearance and beauty. But appear-
ance and beauty should not be viewed phallogocentri-
cally since for Nietzsche such phenomena are more valu-
able than their metaphysical opposites or equivalents. 
Women's ability to lie greatly and graciously and crea-
tively endears woman to Nietzsche. Hence he claims 
that the Nietzsches "love and honor" women "precisely 
for this art and this instinct in woman." Woman knows 
how to render dogmatism or seriousness impotent. In 
Zarathustra, Nietzsche equates woman with wisdom and 
adds that woman as wisdom "always loves a warrior." 
This chain of ambivalent or ambiguous or paradoxical 
references to woman suggests strongly that the crucial 
questions (art, science, Christianity, truth, etc.) 
that are of supreme philosophical interest to Nietzsche 
involve women fundamentally. 
Derrida has aptly maintained in Spurs that "it is 
impossible to dissociate the questions of art, style, 
and truth from the question of woman."11' The question 
is not, where is the place of woman in Nietzsche? or 
what kind of woman is there in Nietzsche? There is no 
one place for woman, and there is no one kind of woman 
in Nietzsche. In Nietzsche, women are everywhere, and 
in Nietzsche, women come in kinds: bad women and good 
women, ugly women and beautiful women, old women and 
young women, wives and mothers, lovers and mistresses, 
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etc. But Nietzsche could not pin women down because of 
their complexity, their deepness, for as he confesses 
to us in Zarathustra, "Everything about woman is a 
riddle" (p. 178). Perhaps, woman is man's paradox, for 
she seems to be what many men simultaneously desire 
most and yet abhor most. She is both poison and medi-
cine and, therefore, dangerous. A sick man needs her 
medicine, but in securing her medicine the sick man may 
be poisoned intentionally or accidentally. It is, 
therefore, very dangerous to play with woman. Woman is 
a potent, and seductive, and dangerous necessity in 
life--a fact which enables her to assume easily and ef-
fectively the ascetic or anti-ascetic mode of being in 
the world. 
Two types of feminism seem to surface in Nietzsche: 
proactive feminism and reactive feminism. Reactive 
feminism is associated with the traditional conception 
of equal rights which tries to make males out of fe-
males. Proactive feminism is associated with those who 
urge women to create their own image instead of suc-
cumbing to the enslaving image of them created by man. 
As he puts it, "it is man who creates for himself the 
image of woman, and woman forms herself according to 
this image" (Gay Science, Sec. 68). Man creates this 
image of woman not to benefit woman or to benefit man 
and woman but to benefit only man, only himself. 
Nietzsche reiterates this Ec.ce Hpro°. statement 
elsewhere: "Man created woman—but what out of? Out 
of a rib of his God, of his 'ideal' . . . " (Twilight of 
the Idols, 23). As women try to de-create man 1s image 
of them and create woman's image of women, men will re-
create their own image of women as well as their own 
image of themselves; of course, women will also develop 
their own image of men. What it is to be a woman, and 
what it is to be a free woman are not mutually exclu-
sive, and that is the proper task of feminism. 
Nietzsche says that his god is a god that can dance, 
and Emma Goldman (the 19th/20th C. feminist) says of 
the feminist movement of her time, "If I can't dance I 
don't want to be a part of your revolution."1* 
It is against this background that the stylistic 
plays of gaiety and gravity, which heavily involve 
woman, should be considered. As Nietzsche states it: 
"A real man wants two things: danger and play. There-
fore he wants woman as the most dangerous plaything" 
(Zarathustra, 178). And in Ecce Homo he proudly de-
clares^ n I do not know any other way of associating 
with great tasks than play" (p. 258). But he warns 
that play should not be seen as a form of escapism. 
Rather, play is a means of deepening oneself in 
dangerous living since such playful life perpetually 
and fundamentally involves uncertainty and ambiguity. 
He then urges us to seek joy in such uncertainty and 
ambiguity (Beyond Good and Evil, Section 205). The 
plays of gaiety and gravity call for "the occasional 
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will of the spirit to let itself be deceived, perhaps 
with a mischievous notion that such and such is not the 
case, that it is only being allowed to pass for the 
case, a joy in uncertainty and ambiguity . . . " (Beyond 
Good and Evil, Section 230). 
Life therefore becomes, for Nietzsche, a text, a 
book of books to be critiqued continuously. Art with-
out a transcendent goal becomes a major player in the 
reading exercises because it recognizes de facto that 
"The conditions of life might include error" and that 
"the falseness of a judgment is to us not necessarily 
an objection to a judgment . . . . The question is to 
what extent it is life-advancing, life-preserving, 
species-preserving, perhaps even species-breeding" (The 
Gay Science, Section 121). Nietzsche's "fundamental 
tendency is to assert that the falsest judgments (to 
which synthetic judgments a priori belong) are the most 
indispensable to us, that without granting as true the 
fictions of logic, without a continual falsification of 
the world by means of numbers, mankind could not live--
that to renounce false judgments would be to renounce 
life, would be to deny life" (Beyond Good and Evil, 
Section 4 ) . It-is in this context that he declares 
that "Life is no argument" and that art is worth more 
than truth. Real and ideal (unreal) truths are essen-
tial to an affirmation of this world. Art permits per-
spective which in turn permits the uttering of "truth," 
even "truth as such." He adds: "we have arranged for 
ourselves a world in which we can live--by positing 
bodies, lines, planes, causes and effects, motion and 
rest, form and content; without these articles of faith 
nobody now could endure life" (The Gay Science, Section 
121). It is in the above sense that he "argues" that 
life is no argument. 
IV. Christianity and Woman 
At the end of Ecce Homo, Nietzsche poses his con-
flict with Christianity as Dionysus versus the 
Crucified. He maintains in The Anti-Christ that the 
only "Evangel" died on the cross, that what has since 
been called the evangel is really a "dysangel"—bringer 
of ill news. He sees the revolt of Jesus as a rebel-
lion against Judaism, against its social hierarchy, 
caste, privilege, etc. He claims that it was for this 
brief but serious or radical challenge of this hier-
archy, so existentially indispensable to the Jewish 
nation, that Jesus was sent to the cross, and that 
Jesus died not for the guilt of others but for his own. 
In other words, one can only die one's own death; one 
cannot die another's death. Therefore, one dies one's 
death for one's self, not for the selves of others. 
Nietzsche makes it clear that he is not interested in 
"the truth" about what Jesus said or did, or in how he 
really died. He insists that it is misleading to see 
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Jesus as a hero or a cjenuis. For him, Jesus is more of 
a Dostoevskian idiot. Because Jesus was "immersed en-
tirely in symbols and incomprehensiveness," the first 
disciples or Christian community had to translate his 
character into a simple type stripped of "multiplicity 
and contradictions." 
He rejects the literal treatment of Jesus' language 
and adds that Jesus never cared for anything fixed. 
For Jesus, the fixed word killeth. Nietzsche's point 
should be taken seriously especially when one realizes 
that Jesus often spoke in parables. Jesus himself, 
like woman herself, is a riddle. He regarded language 
as "merely the value of a sign, a metaphor." Nietzsche 
further contends that the concepts of guilt, punish-
ment, and reward—which are the results of "sin" men-
tality which distances any connection "between God and 
man"—were introduced not by the evangel but the 
dysangel. Put differently, traditional or Pauline 
Christianity is an oversimplification of the complex 
Christ and the complex reality of existence. 
The rooting of Christianity in a world beyond this 
world is the basis of Nietzsche's war with Christian-
ity. There has only been one de facto Christian, and 
he died on the cross. Nietzsche maintains that such 
creative primitive Christianity is still possible and 
even necessary for some, not only for today but always. 
Creative Christianity, for Nietzsche, is "not a belief 
but a doing, above all a not-doing of many things, a 
different being." Jesus "denied any chasm between God 
and man," abolished "the concept of 'guilt' itself" and 
"lived this unity of God and man as his 'glad 
tidings'." 
Pauline Christianity, however, juggled away this 
"whole and sole reality of the Evangel" by introducing 
the doctrine of a Judgment and a Second Coming as well 
as the whole guilt complex including Jesus' death as a 
sacrificial death. Pauline Christians henceforth 
reward their followers with a belief in personal immor-
tality or a hereafter (The Anti-Christ Section 42). 
When he later indicts "ressentiment and impotent 
revengefulness" he identifies Paul as "the greatest of 
all apostles of revenge" and says: 
what sets us apart is not that we recognize no 
God, either in history or in nature or behind 
nature—but that we find that which has been rev-
erenced as God, not 'godlike' but pitiable, ab-
surd, harmful, not merely an error but a crime 
against life . . . . If this God of the Chris-
tians were proved to us to exist, we should know 
even less how to believe in him (The Anti-Christ, 
Section 45). 
God, as created by Paul, is a denial or denigration of 
God and this world. Pauline Christianity freezes 
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thinking. Nietzsche tells us in Ecce Homo, "I am too 
inquisitive, too Questionable, too exuberant to stand 
for any gross answer. God is a gross answer, an in-
delicacy against us thinkers—at bottom merely a gross 
prohibition for us: you shall not think!" Rather, God 
is "much more interested in a question on which the 
'salvation of humanity' depends far more than on any 
theologians' curio: the question of nutrition 
|education/nurture 1" ("Why I Am So Clever," 236-37). 
Nietzsche's famous or infamous "God is dead" pro-
clamation, which he, in fact, appropriated from Martin 
Luther, "is not," as Heidegger properly points out, "an 
atheistic [statement, butj a formula for the fundamen-
tal experience of an event in Occidental history" 
(Nietzsche 1, 156). However, it is not a formula but a 
reality, for the term "formula" smacks of contrivance 
or insincerity. Furthermore, the proclamation is not 
theistic either. Nietzsche's admiration for Jesus is 
not total; it is safe to say that Nietzsche is basi-
cally anti-Christ but not anti-Jesus. 
Nietzsche's analysis of the Genesis story of crea-
tion, which he calls "the story of God's mortal terror 
of science," shows the link between Christianity, 
woman, science, and the ascetic ideal. He re-creates 
the story as we all always do. The old God who was at 
first carefree became bored and made his first two 
mistakes in his attempt to overcome his boredom: he 
invented man and woman. (We should remember that in 
"Why I Write Such Good Books"--Eece Homo he describes 
"the state of nature" as "the eternal war between the 
sexes" (p. 267]). Woman was created out of the rib of 
a man because man was bored and needed a partner or 
source of pleasure. Woman put an end to man's boredom, 
but in doing so she also brought evil and pain with 
her. The Genesis story essentially sees woman as a 
seductive serpent through whom "every evil comes into 
the world . . . (and] consequently, science (God's mor-
tal terror| comes into the world through (her since) 
only through woman did men learn to taste of the tree 
of knowledge." God then realized that he had created a 
rival. 
Science becomes the original sin, the germ of 
humanity. "Thou shalt not know" becomes the guiding 
morality, and the question "How can one defend oneself 
against science?" becomes the overriding problem, which 
is dealt with through having priests. The priest 
drives man out of Paradise. Thinking is proscribed 
since all thoughts are bad thoughts. ''Man shall not 
think" becomes the only morality. When science 
threatens heaven, God invents war--the war between man 
and woman. This war is intended to divert science from 
heaven as the target to earth as the victim. This war 
succeeds in originating and consolidating human attach-
ment to the God-appointed ascetic priest. With the 
concept of sin, therefore, the ascetic priest invents 
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and whets human distaste for this world and human ap-
petite for a world beyond this world. Consequently, 
"sin" becomes "that form par excellence of the self-
violation of man." Nietzsche" believes that sin is the 
invention that makes "science, culture, every kind of 
elevation and nobility of man impossible." The priest 
becomes the apostle of the ascetic ideal par excellence 
and "rules through the invention of sin" (The Anti.7 
Christ," Sections 48-49). 
Ironically, woman, who was the sower of science, 
becomes the priest's main agent for infecting science. 
Seductive Eve brought knowledge to ignorant Adam. The 
priest knows too well that what has worked for wisdom 
will also work for sin. Woman becomes the prime candi-
date for deceptions, illusions, dissimulations, simula-
cra, etc. Platonism, which pursues the ascetic ideal, 
becomes woman, as Nietzsche tells us in his "history of 
an error." But woman does not stop metamorphosing 
here; she becomes Christian. We remember also that the 
statement of Platonism becoming a woman is the only un-
derlined or stressed statement in the entire second 
sequence of this six-stage history. Yet, when Heideg-
ger comments extensively on Nietzsche's "history of an 
error," he ignores this Christian woman. The ascetic 
ideal becomes a woman, and woman becomes a Christian. 
Pauline Christianity "womanizes" the ascetic ideal to 
make it palatable. 
V. Resituating the Ascetic Ideal 
Nietzsche admits that he has the force and taste of 
two millenia of the Christian ideal to contend with, 
but says, "The last thing I should promise would be to 
'improve' mankind. No new idols are erected by me; let 
the old ones learn what feet of clay mean" (Preface, 
Section 2, Ecce Homo). He again maintains that he is 
not out to destroy Christianity and replace it with 
another "ism" but deprivilege it. In such a war 
against Christianity compromise is ruled out. He 
laments the betrayal of other anti-ascetic idealists 
whom he can no longer count on because they themselves 
have become promoters of the ascetic ideal. Perhaps it 
is this impasse marked by the confrontation of art and 
truth in relation to the ascetic ideal and his isola-
tion generated by the betrayal of loved allies that 
awes Nietzsche. 
For Nietzsche, the ascetic ideal represents the 
greatest danger to humanity. The ascetic ideal (under 
the guise of humanism which supposedly caters to the 
well-being of humanity), is in reality the corrosion of 
humanity. He is not seeking to destroy the power of 
the ascetic ideal, he is seeking a match for it, a sit-
uation similar to Foucault's insistence that "we must 
. . . conceive of . . . power without the king." Hence 
he resorts to the economy of gaiety and gravity. He 
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points out in The Gay Science under the title "Our 
Ultimate Gratitude to Art1': 
If we had not welcomed the arts and invented this 
kind of cult of the untrue, then the realization 
of general untruth and mendaciousness that now 
comes to us through science—the realization that 
delusion and error are conditions of human knowl-
edge and sensation—would be utterly unbearable. 
Honesty would lead to nausea and suicide. But 
now there is a counterforce against our honesty 
that helps us to avoid such consequences: art as 
the good will to appearance. (Section 107) 
Hence, Nietzsche claims that art is worth more than 
truth because existence is bearable only as an aes-
thetic phenomenon. 
Nietzsche's stance toward the ascetic ideal is 
somewhat akin to that of Confucius. When Tselu, a 
disciple of Confucius, asked Confucius "about the wor-
ship of the celestial and earthly spirits," Confucius 
replied, "We don't know yet how to serve men, how can 
we know about serving the spirits?" And to a question 
about death, Confucius answered, "We don't know yet 
about life, how can we know about- death?" 1' This 
world, this earth, this life, this existence entails 
much suffering and much pain. But this great suffering 
is no sufficient reason to negate this world, this 
life, this earth for a beyond or a hereafter. 
Nietzsche urges us not to take ourselves too seri-
ously: "At times we need a rest from ourselves by 
looking upon, by looking down upon ourselves and, from 
an artistic distance, laughing over ourselves or weep-
ing over ourselves." He encourages us to 
discover the hero no less than the fool in our 
passion for knowledge; we must occasionally find 
pleasure in our folly, or we cannot continue to 
find pleasure in our wisdom. Precisely because 
we are at bottom grave and serious human beings— 
really, more weights than human beings—nothing 
does as much good as a fool' s cap_: we need it in 
relation to ourselves—we need all exuberant, 
floating, dancing, mocking, childish, and bliss-
ful art lest we lose the freedom above things 
that our ideal demands for us, with our irritable 
honesty, to get involved entirely in morality 
and, for the sake of the over-severe demands that 
we make on ourselves in these matters, to become 
virtuous monsters and scarecrows. (The Gay Sci-
ence, Section 107) 
Nietzsche adds, "We should be able also to stand above 
morality |as well as| float above it and play." As he 
says and demonstrates again and again, "I do not know 
171 
any other way of associating with great tasks than 
play." This play is the overman's dance, and it in-
volves a multiplicity of styles, which I have marked in 
this discussion as the economy of gaiety and gravity. 
In The Birth Nietzsche says that only as an aes-
thetic phenomenon is existence justified, but in The 
Gay Science, where he already has a better insight into 
the overman's dance, he rephrases this statement. He 
says this time: "As an aesthetic phenomenon existence 
is still bearable for us." He changes "justified" to 
"bearable,'r and "bearable" is underscored (Section 
197). Justification evokes some positivism, for as he 
has already indicated, life is not an argument like a 
mathematical problem requiring proofs. The insistence 
on, or expectation of, such proofs will only generate 
suicidal or pitiful or mendacious life-negating 
thoughts. Hence he charges Christianity, which has 
primarily determined the values of the Western world in 
the last two millenia, with calling "truth" what, in 
fact, is "the most harmful, insidious, and subterranean 
form of lie; the holy pretext of 'improving' mankind, 
as the ruse for sucking the blood of life itself." 
Nietzsche, therefore, restates the ground of his life-
long critique: Christianity invented the concept of 
"God" "as a counterconcept of life" and the "concept of 
the 'beyond', the 'true world' . . . in order to deval-
uate the only world there is—in order to retain no 
goal, no reason, no task for our earthly reality!" 
(Genealogy, Sections 7 and 8 ) . 
Christianity wills nothingness for this world in 
order to will "something" for a beyond, but Nietzsche 
wills this world for this world. He seems to say that 
this is all we can do. Nietzsche, perhaps the profound 
Western jester, calls on us to re-examine our tradi-
tional notion of security. What does it mean to be 
secure? Why do we always associate certainty with 
security and uncertainty with insecurity, and what is 
wrong with insecurity? He tells us in The Gay Science 
(Section 283): "the secret for harvesting from ex-
istence the greatest fruitfulness and the greatest en-
joyment is--to live dangerously!" 
It is, therefore, not surprising that Nietzsche 
waged a lifelong war against the ascetic ideal. This 
ideal symbolizes the crucial source of his creative 
dissatisfaction with Western culture as it manifested 
itself in the notions of "humanism" in 19th C. Germany. 
But how can dangerous living, which surely entails in-
security which the ascetic ideal forbids, effectively 
"compete" in today's world? 1 7 Nietzsche's philosophy 
is perspectivism without nihilism. 
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